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Chapter 2  
The Belt Road Initiative: 
Views from the Chinese Side and European Side  
Ying Zhang1 
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University  
Although the BRI has been acknowledged as a cross-continent project being expected to benefit 
both sides of the world (the Western and the Eastern), the tension and misunderstanding, instead, 
are still in dominance, particularly for practitioners. I would like to propose solutions from both 
theoretical and practical perspectives. My motivation and hope is to offer certain insights and 
implications to my audience, in order to facilitate the progress of rethinking about our shared 
traits — pursuing common goals by acknowledging differences.  
Introduction 
Deeply rooted in the ancient Eurasian Silk Road developed over thousands of years ago, and lately 
revisited by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 in the period of China’s economic transition, 
the BRI, also named the New Silk Road and One-Belt-One-Road, has been seemingly widely 
accepted as an initiative to facilitate cross-continent trade, geo-economic integration, and global 
prosperity. However, with regard to this idea, since its emergence, it has been interpreted variously, 
mainly in two directions: aptly reflecting what China has been challenged with in terms of 
domestically slowing-down economic growth, and boldly projecting the growing influence of 
                                                          
1 Associate professor at Rotterdam School of Management. The founder and managing partner of The New Silk Road Group 
(think tank; www.new-silk-road.org) 
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China onto the global landscape with an alternative international geo-economic relationship 
approach. This initiative has also elicited three kinds of mixed reflexes or concerns: respect and/or 
awe; enthusiasm and/or paranoia (toward its proposer—China — as a provider of a visionary idea 
to the world); and it raises the question of whether this idea (BRI) is an altruistic game changer for 
the world, or if it is just another plot from an egotistically motivated superpower to further its own 
self-interest. 
 
The concern comes with a reason, similarly to the pursuit of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
by other superpowers (such as the United States) that was lauded as well as criticized. Some 
thought of it as a beacon of world trade, giving the economies of the Pacific rim their well-deserved 
trading club; while others saw it as just another instrument to align the pacific rim allies in an 
exclusive club of economic cooperation. With the unexpected withdrawal of the USA from the 
TPP under the Trump Administration, the general attention has shifted to the other forward-
looking initiative of the BRI and China has ultimately been catapulted into the position as a thought 
leader to build a new world order. This position draws the eyes of the entire world to discuss the 
BRI offered by China and of course, expose China to the risk of losing its ordinary charm vis-à-
vis the ordinary onlooker. 
 
The current wave of reaction to the BRI is mixed, with enthusiasm to the BRI from some countries 
and criticism and worries from others. In the three years the BRI -framework projects have taken 
place across the Eurasian Continent from mid-2013, the lines have been shifting as disappointment 
has become a reality. Typically, many countries of the world started as supportive toward the BRI 
platform, as they see tangible advantages both in the short and long term, while others continue to 
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beat the drum against this change. There are also some torn between believing in the benefits of a 
new vision and fearing its ramifications that they cannot fully grasp. Their wait-and-see-attitude is 
a linchpin.  
 
As an important financial arm of the BRI, the AIIB2 (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) has 
been widely accepted and operated. Over the years, comments about the role of AIIB and the 
"special connection" with BRI projects have been diverse, with clear categories emerging 
depending on whether profit is measured by economic or social axes. As AIIB is structurally 
considered to be more like a cooperative, it would make sense that the BRI - as its investment 
target platform - is not only joint owned, but also the one requiring shared-commitment (including 
design, plan, investment, and execution). However, this so far is hard to foresee from the European 
side. Europeans worry about the consequences of AIIB as a possible future financial order in the 
future (similar to the World Bank), and the BRI as an arm for the logistics and trade of new rule, 
with Europeans not participating in shared ownership.  
There are always multiple interpretations from and towards different layers, regarding an initiative. 
To face the change of the world and to build a harmonious global society,  each participant, 
theoretically, needs to carefully take into consideration the facts of the past, seriously see through 
the phenomena of the current, and ethically plan for the future, by taking account of the influence 
of technology and geo-social-economics. The future is the future for all communities, not only for 
a particular member or a specific club. Therefore, the BRI, as a cross-continent platform with the 
                                                          
2 AIIB, commonly labelled as a "crowd-funded and crowd-owned" project. 
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vision of facilitating common prosperity, should be authentically treated as a jointly owned 
instrument, to nurture our future society with the nature of an equality-based social-economic 
environment.   
 
Theoretical Background: Equality and Universal Value 
In the past centuries, especially after world word II, a polarized world was composed of capitalism-
oriented (including market, state, and social capitalism) and communist-ruled nations. Equality, 
usually in the eyes of economists and politicians, relates to equal economic income and 
opportunity. During the early and middle decades of the twentieth century, the western world 
achieved reduced inequality on these two pillars dramatically, even without commonly shared 
visions between different classes. The economy in the west, following the two industrial 
revolutions, had achieved fast growth and per capita growth kept at the highest level. Opportunities 
were called to be equal, echoed particularly by education, social welfare, and gradually equal 
access to the job market by the blue and white collars. The instrument to facilitate such equality 
was not others, but something that most of the social capitalist countries still conduct today: social 
insurance, minimum wage, welfare framework, progressive income tax and equal access to 
education.   
 
There are three causes (conditions) in that period driving equality. First, the fear of social and 
political turmoil from the West if without proper reform, due to the continuous threat from the 
opponent ruled by communists' alliances of the Soviet Union. Second, the impact of two World 
Wars on people and nations, pushing the world to seek for the peace and equality in wealth. Third, 
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the rise of the revolutionary belief in favouring collective force, destiny, and prosperity. However, 
since the 1980s when Soviet Union's alliances started collapsing, these three factors, drawing from 
the side of competition between two ideologies (capitalism and communism), as well as fear (to 
be disrupted by the other side), started to become self-disruptive. This disruption process later on 
exaggerated the growth of the concept of a rather exclusive ideological norm (determined by 
winners), favouring economic return and economic equality seemingly driven by capitalism, free-
market principles, and democracy. Such equality achieved by the west cannot be completely 
claimed as equality if associated with its central merit - the social dimension. Sociologically, 
equality has the merit of identifying and respecting the difference in commonality amongst people, 
organizations, and national regimes. Running vastly on the track to harvest as much short-term 
economic returns as possible with discrimination (including discriminating up and discriminating 
down) to particular groups is not called equality because depriving one group of opportunities to 
enrich the other 's cannot be the way to reach economic and even social equality broadly.  
Therefore, being of a singularity, in the sense of identifying uniqueness and applying such unique 
value to the communities and others via reciprocal relationships, is the core of equality. The 
question then becomes, with the rule of capitalism3, where does equality emerge from? 
 
Since the two biggest geo-economic-political shocks (from two world wars and the collapse of the 
Former Soviet Union), the phenomena aforementioned (in the last paragraph) has been retained in 
the current world order. Prosperity, similar to all other good things (for example, people are 
                                                          
3 which means inequality and insecurity are the default offspring (i.e.Muller, 2013) 
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happier, more democratic, and less likely to go to war with one another4), form the basis of what 
humans are expecting/hoping but paradoxically conflicts with what the behaviour of humans 
seems to dictate (i.e., behavioral discrimination to the alternative ideologies). Such a conflict 
between expectation and action facilitates the dark side of individualism (promoted by liberty and 
democracy) to be selfish and discriminative, instead of appreciating singularity. Singularity is 
different from individualism; it calls for the uniqueness, the unique value of uniqueness to a 
broader community. Singularity considers human's universal values5 as an aggregate value to 
achieve, such as power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, 
benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987). From this angle, the 
BRI (with its goal to reach a shared  prosperity) can be a practice to use singularity to achieve 
equality and bring universal values to the global community in terms of achievement (bringing up 
capability, influence, and intelligence for each region), hedonism (bringing in pleasure and 
happiness for people), universalism (developing more equality and peace, unifying with nature, 
harmony between each other), benevolence (being honest, forgiving, and responsibility to each 
other), tradition (respect, humility, moderation), and security (stability of social order, 
reciprocation of favours). 
 
Specifically, within these ten universal values, power (reflected by social status and prestige, 
control or dominance over people and resources, and the motivation underpinning some values) 
plays a very critical role in guiding the other nine universal values. If power cannot be treated 
                                                          
4 Gregory Treverton, Letter from the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the report of Global Trends: Paradox of 
Progress (2017) 
5 Universal Values have two following ways to be understood: the value that everyone finds valuable, and the value that everyone 
has reason to believe it has value. 
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appropriately (in this sense I mean power mainly serves economic-driven aims, like in the 
economic-return driven system), its effect will emerge to exaggerate the attainment and 
preservation of a dominant position within the more general social system for specific groups 
(Schartwz, 2012). And such an exaggerating effect feeds inequality, strengthens discrimination, 
and accentuates individualism, killing the other nine universal values (at the community level), 
and disregarding the value of singularity. 
 
The Paradox in the BRI 
The Belt Road Initiative (the BRI), originally named as One Belt One Road (from Oct. 2013-mid 
of 2016), inspired by China's ancient "Silk Road" back from Tang/Song Dynasty, is the latest 
Chinese international strategy, at both China's national and corporate levels. This strategy is 
structured to build up (stronger) connections and cooperation amongst Eurasian countries, via the 
Belt and Road Connections (The belt refers to the land-based economic belt, and road refers to the 
ocean-going Maritime Road). In the past few years until the end of 2017, the BRI - since the first 
stage of focusing on infrastructure investment, construction, railway and highway, automobile, 
power grid, and iron and steel - has become one of the biggest infrastructure investments in human 
history. In total, it spans across 68 states, 40 percent of world GDP, and around 65 percent of the 
world population in 2017 (Ramasamy, Yeung, Utoktham, Duval, 2017).   
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With a very abstract vision, the BRI has structured six different economic corridors6. Viewing the 
BRI's day-to-day map progression, the signal sent to and received by China is that the BRI is not 
merely a Eurasian Project, but also a project starting to involve Oceania and Africa. The fast 
development of the BRI, in contrast to the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, has filled the rest of the world with widely varied responses over time.  In 
general, there are mainly two responses about the BRI at present: (1) the BRI is considered to be 
a strategy that the Chinese (government) are using to transfer China's domestic economic 
overcapacity to the overseas market; (2) the BRI is created by the Chinese side as an alternative 
international geo-political approach to deal with the complex global geopolitical environment. It 
explains that an economic relationship (such as via investment and collaboration) with players 
from neighbouring countries could strengthen the mutual understanding between China and other 
countries and therefore release the potential macro-level tensions (i.e., geopolitical) at different 
times. These two responses are not independent but integrated as a paradoxical emotion proffered 
by the rest of the world. The BRI has elicited respect and awe, while simultaneously provoking 
enthusiasm and paranoia.  
 
                                                          
6 New Eurasian Land Bridge, from Western China to Western Russia through Kazakhstan. 
 China–Mongolia–Russia Corridor, running from Northern China to Eastern Russia 
China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor, running from Western China to Turkey 
China–Indochina Peninsula Corridor, running from Southern China to Singapore 
China–Myanmar–Bangladesh–India Corridor, running from Southern China to Myanmar 
China–Pakistan Corridor, from South-Western China to Pakistan 
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Such a paradoxical response from the rest of the world is not surprising, but the reason for such a 
paradox does have an association with an Inept Systematic Intelligence (ISI) that most countries 
have held. This ISI is primarily determined by one of the universal values mentioned before — 
power. An existing power does not usually accept a new rising power (which might hold alternative 
regimes and beliefs). The relationship between the existing power and the rising power is similar 
to the paradoxical relationship between the entrepreneurs and existing firms in the process of 
creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1994), whereby entrepreneurs constitute the disruptive force that 
sustains economic growth, however, they also challenge the value of established companies and 
laborers (Sidak and Teece, 2009). This applies to China, as one of the current economic powers, 
and the BRI project they are initiating. The BRI has caused enormous doubt for many western 
countries. There doubt is derived from a fear that China, with its economic power, aims to destroy 
the existing world power structure and the existing world order, because China’s breakthrough 
economic growth record (for the continuous 3 decades) and its alternative regime of domestic 
power system (a country governed by a single party, named as dictatorship) is equipped to do so. 
Regarding this, China has always denied in both words and action. 
 
Propositions Derived from the BRI Practice 
Regarding the two different responses to the BRI, one view believes that the BRI is a beacon of 
world trade, giving the economies of the Pacific rim their well-deserved trading club.  This view 
is often held by two types of countries [noted here as C1& C2]: nation C1 depicts those whose 
GDP depends heavily on international trade and overseas market such as the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands; nation C2 depicts those who need to economically catch up in the short-term 
(such as many eastern European countries, Poland and Lithuania). These two group of countries, 
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similar to innovative firms and latecomer firms at a corporate level, are usually (pro)active in 
attempts to understand and participate in the BRI-related projects. The BRI in this case is more 
likely to be interpreted as an opportunity rather than a threat.    
 
The other view, on the side of either being against or having a strategy of wait-and-see-then-react, 
is held by those who apart of the current global geo-political-economic power and act in the centre 
of the present world-order (such as France, U.K. Germany, the U.S.A., Japan etc.) [here noted as 
C3]. This group of countries is reluctant to accept new initiatives by others, similar to those 
incumbent firms that cannot easily open doors to newcomers into the market because of the effect 
of creative destruction in disrupting the existed order built by them. With this view, the BRI, 
initiated by an economic follower, could be seen as an alternative instrument to align its pacific 
rim allies to an alternative exclusive club of economic cooperation.  
 
The complexity of the BRI network 
The Chinese Party claims that the BRI is a global strategy, with a vision to bring shared prosperity 
to the global population. Regarding its structure, the BRI is a multilateral network. If taking China 
as the node of network centrality (initiator) with other network nodes, the principal characteristic 
of the BRI network is its high level of heterogeneity (of countries). These countries, in another 
dimension, can be north countries and south countries (noted as NC and SC; rich and poor, in other 
words). With regard to China's positioning in the BRI network, China stays in-between currently: 
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between the rich and poor (in terms of GDP Per capita), between C2 and post-C27  (measured by 
China's fast growth of GDP in the past few decades and ranked as the second largest economic 
country in the world), and between C1 and C38 (measured by China's export in goods and service 
in GDP: 17.58% in 2017, compared to 86.46% in the Netherlands in 2017). This complexity of 
China's position brings difficulties for other network players in understanding the purpose and 
action of China in such an initiative, and secondly generates hardship in progressing the BRI at an 
aggregated level. Therefore, the first proposition is: 
 
 Proposition 1: The BRI will not be easily understood and executed, because of the high degree of 
heterogeneity of BRI associated countries and the complexity of the BRI's initiator in its eco-social 
positioning (C1, C2, and C3). 
 
To analyze the BRI network complexity, the BRI-network players need to be clustered by their 
geo-economic-positioning natures (C1, C2, or C3) as mentioned previously. The reason is to 
reduce the cognitive gap in understanding and to improve the efficiency in the execution of the 
BRI projects in different regions. In the countries denoted as C1 and C2, the BRI has slowly 
switched from a giant multi-lateral project to numerous bi-lateral projects via merger & 
acquisitions or green-field investments by Chinese corporates.  
 
                                                          
7 due to China's dual development pattern between China's East and West, Urban and Rural 
 
8 due to China as the frontier players in the 4th industrial revolution and positioning as an economic power 
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In addition to clusters, the complexity of the BRI network implies that working with partners 
should be on the order of one by one (country), if partners are not from the same cluster. 
Strategically, it is efficient to do so in that it improves China's bargaining power and significantly 
reduces the level of heterogeneity9 in the existing complex geo-politics relationship, if, as what is 
stated at the beginning of this chapter to consider the BRI as a shared property, the BRI can be a 
cooperatively governed institution where China should share the ownership, responsibility, 
actions, and consequences with others. Thus, the format of cooperative (in game theory) can be 
delivered in many scenarios. Firstly, with a very limited number of members (for example working 
one by one with the BRI members), the reduced heterogeneity10 can induce the emergence of 
cooperatives (as governance structure), as long as one party in such a cooperative would actively 
play like a champion (China, as the initiator and network centrality, in this case, is considered to 
be proactive). Therefore, this brings us to proposition 2. 
  
Proposition 2: The one-to-one cooperative model can be effective (emerged) if China (as the 
network node in the BRI centrality) works with countries with a lower level of heterogeneity (for 
example, in South Asia and Central Asia)  
 
The European Union embraces a high-level of complexity, in its members' various economic 
development levels, investment demands, and geopolitical relationships with China. To this case, 
using strategies such as Proposition 2 will not be effective, because it will be against the EU's 
collective vision and internal agreements, laws, and norms. If abstractly simulating in a 
                                                          
9 in such case means several quality and/or content in social norms, customs, regulations, etc. 
10 because it is impossible for two members with same nature, reducing heterogeneity to a medium level is already satisfying 
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game11(without the reality that there are no coordinators between EU and China on the BRI 
Project), a third proposition in light of this case is:   
 
 Proposition 3:  If there is no outsider (a third party) as a coordinator to manage the complex 
group, the governance of a cooperative (for the BRI) will not emerge in a top-down approach. 
 
The reality is, by far, that the BRI hasn't set up any central coordinating groups/committees 
composed by both the Chinese side and the European side. First, the BRI hasn't been legitimatised 
by the major countries in the EU and the EU commission from the top. Second, due to a lack of 
legacy from the top, the BRI has left a big space for entrepreneurs from both sides to collaborate 
freely. From the eyes of Europeans however, the bottom-up collaboration is hardly planned by the 
top and systematically controlled by the top. The propositions12 are therefore as follows.  
  
Proposition 4.1: Emerging from a bottom-up approach, entrepreneurs from both sides will search 
for partners with similarity, with a medium or lower level of heterogeneity. 
  
 Proposition 4.2: Such collaborations will not be bonded to outsiders in the same way as in a top-
down approach. Outsiders (project managers or coordinators) in the scenarios with an 
                                                          
11 due to the limitation of the space, I will not elaborate the simulation. The abstracted simulation can be referred to the chapter 2 of my Ph.D. student Anna Petruchenya's  (2018) Ph.D. thesis 
12 The simulation will not be shown here. If interested, please refer to Anna Petruchenya's  (2018)  
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entrepreneurs' bottom-up approach will show a high value. Business is constructed in a manner 
of "either take it or leave it" with selfish outsiders.   
 
As proposed above, working at a high level of heterogeneity within EU, the emergence of a 
cooperative appears rather difficult, if without outsiders (official coordinator in between). Under 
such a circumstance, opportunities are therefore given to a bottom-up approach involving 
entrepreneurial cooperation between the two sides (and it does happen); however, the freedom of 
doing reciprocal business is still significantly restrained by the underdeveloped bi- or multi-lateral 
higher-level agreements.  One key executive (anonymous) from a BRI-related project from the 
European side stated that "the transparent and open talk between Europe and China is missing. 
Europe should talk to China in one mouth, rather than in ten mouths"; Another said:"….in order 
to build shared destiny, we need to start talking"; "…to a business, there are no worries in logistics, 
but the local government has worries about the political influence of China". Also, due to many 
organizations using the BRI as a title to act as a fake broker rather than an officially appointed 
coordinator, many BRI-associated European entrepreneurs have raised doubts about the credibility 
of the BRI. Common questions usually mentioned at the EU or state level roundtables by European 
business players are, for example, "is there a list or database of what BRI- associated firms and 
projects are?”, “can I trust this list? Is there signed approval, the guarantee of quality? And what 
about BRI people and organizations? Who owns the BRI? Shared ownership or China itself?"  
 
To think of the possible solutions (together with the propositions mentioned above) - supposing in 
the future that coordinators at different levels can be either voted (bottom-up) or appointed (top-
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down) by both sides - by applying  the game-playing simulation (Petruchenya, 2018, ch. 2), a 
possible solution to bringing about an efficient cooperative for the BRI between EU and China can 
be as follows:  
  
Solutions to emerging cooperatives and improving efficiency in such a cooperative like the BRI: 
An outsider (coordinator or coordinating committee participated by both the EU and China sides) 
needs to be arranged, and (a) if its value is high to the BRI attended members, a top-down 
approached cooperation will be efficient; (b) If its value is low, a bottom-up approached 
benevolent outsider (such as an NGO) can be compelling.  
 
Issues of the BRI Paradox 
In the past five years, the BRI projects on land and maritime have exhibited a paradox at various 
levels. For the Chinese side, the paradox is mainly presented on the execution nerve between 
localization and globalization. For the European side, towards the BRI, a paradox exists as well, 
mostly at the cognitive level. The paradox here exists between the EU, state, and enterprise levels, 
in addition to the way various understandings of the BRI have emerged and treatment of the BRI 
as an opportunity or threat.  
 
Firstly, Chinese firms' international progress, before and after the BRI, has always been one of the 
strong drivers of China's economic growth. Since the early 1980s, internationalization of Chinese 
organizations had gone through from the mode of international trade (from a little to a massive 
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quantity) to collaboration with inward foreign investment, and to outward Chinese investment 
(including massive global merger &acquisitions) (i.e., Zhang, 2014).  Throughout this progress, 
the major issue regarding Chinese movement into the global market, particularly in host countries, 
is its insufficient adaptation to locals' (invested countries) norms, rituals, and conduct of business, 
though it has indeed delivered much positive impact to locals, by bringing in infrastructure, 
technology, capital, and job positions. This is highly in contrast to Chinese firms in adapting to 
foreign investment in the territory of China.   
 
There are a number of reasons for why this occurs. Firstly, there is considerable distance between 
the Chinese and the West in project management and dynamic capabilities (i.e., Zhang, 2015). 
This applies to those Chinese firms shorted in international Chinese talents (who can bridge the 
East and West easily). Secondly, in terms of ownership, there are reasons expressed by Chinese 
corporates as to why a dilemma exist. The dilemma can be explained through dual drives 
(sometimes on the same direction, sometimes with the opposite directions): (1) drives from the 
dual markets (domestic and international); and (2) drives from the dual shareholder (s) 
(governments for state-owned and private investors for private firms).   
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In principle, the drive from the market 
requires firms to respond to the local 
markets effectively, by adapting to local 
rituals, regulations, norms, and conduct 
of business. The drive from the solo 
shareholder, however, determines that 
they have to mainly follow their 
shareholders' orders13, acting as an 
executor rather than an entrepreneurial 
entity. This is a big dilemma for managers and executives in the local/host market because 
concerning corporate governance and the source of investment capital, an intervention from the 
home state is the default. For the sake of job security, anyone would not dare to risk themselves to 
move against an upper order.  
 
For private firms, even if they have an investment in BRI projects, ineptness in localization is also 
a big issue that has been seen in recent years. This is majorly due to the lack of knowledge and 
experience in internationalization14 , the limited access to international information, and the 
shortage of capital and cash flow compared to the state-owned firms. 
 
                                                          
13 sometimes it might not be rational or just for a propaganda's purpose. 
14 even though those Chinese private firms had experience in collaborating with non-Chinese firms in China 
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Therefore, an interesting phenomena emerges: the progress of Chinese firms' internationalization 
is composed of two stages (P1 and P2) (referring to the figure in terms of rows):  the first stage of 
internationalization (collaborating with international firms in China's domestic market) (noted as 
the stage P1- the two grids in the upper row in the figure), and the second stage when Chinese 
firms go abroad, doing business in the international market in the host countries (noted as P2- the 
two grids at the bottom). Regarding both columns, the left column depicts China (home) territory 
relative to the Chinese; while the right column depicts the non-Chinese (host) territory relative to 
the Chinese. To elaborate, Chinese firms adaptation in the past few decades into an international 
arena (from international trade to collaboration with inward foreign investment, noted in the stage 
P1, and to Chinese outward investment noted in the stage P2), the extent of Chinese firms' 
adaptation to locals in the stage P1 appears more significant than that is shown in the stage P2.  
 
To further elaborate, P1 and P2 have an independently dependable relationship. P1 is a sufficient 
by not necessary condition of P2. In the case for Chinese who have experience from both P1 and 
P2, cognitive bias is natural to be generated because one may learn internationalization from the 
P1 stage and likely to apply what is learned in P1 to P2. Though P1 and P2 may share the similar 
types of participants (for example, Chinese may deal with the same western firms in China and 
abroad, however, the approach to deal with partners (for the Chinese side) may not be the same. 
To be more efficient in both P1 and P2, Chinese, for example, must adapt to the foreign cognition 
and behaviour quicker and faster than that of locals. For example, in the stage P1 when foreign 
firms do business in China (the solid line starting from the left to the right), the foreign side has to 
adapt much faster to the local (see the solid line extending to the bottom-left grid) than that of 
Chinese adapting to foreign (in China). With the same logic, when Chinese firms step into a foreign 
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territory, doing business with them, in the stage P2, they need to adapt faster than the locals (the 
upper right grid) in the local territory (see the solid line extending into the upper-right grid). 
However, due to the inertia developed in the P1 stage as mentioned previously, the Chinese 
partners did not develop their adaptation sufficiently (see the dotted lines in the figure representing 
what Chinese firms have been practicing in the P2 scenario), whereas in this case the locals must 
make more effort to adapt (including understanding and compromising to the Chinese side). 
 
Though European entrepreneurs are very entrepreneurial and likely to approach the BRI associated 
projects in a bottom-up way (as mentioned in the last section), under the circumstance where 
macro-level understanding is lacking, their opinions at the micro level are mainly filled with 
worries. For instance, practitioners entail a list of comments such as (anonymous):   
 " … Chinese businesses are coming to your land; they should operate in the way that is operated 
here and not in the Chinese way…." 
 "…and when Chinese money in invested in Eastern Europe, a railroad was built with Chinese 
Financing, so they also were obligated to use Chinese contractors and this is completely against 
the European Law… ";   
 "…from the Chinese perspective, I understand China has its ports and wants to direct their ships 
to their own ports, to manage the whole chain. But that's the Chinese way. Our way of business is 
always to specialize in something you are the best in and leave smoothers in the whole chain to 
other partners who are best in this part… then everyone can specialize and protect his/her part and 
the cooperation."; 
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 "… I am fine that the Chinese want to export their overcapacity, but can I export my stuff to 
China? Can I establish my factories in Shenzhen or Suzhou, or Qingdao (port) (as what the Chinese 
are doing here)? It is not allowed! … If you want to do something in Europe, then you also need 
to open your market….". 
 
Regarding Chinese firms' adaptation in Europe and correspondence from local entrepreneurs and 
stakeholders to Chinese behaviour, there are also some promising examples (though in modest 
proportion) in dealing with the paradox of localization and globalization. One Chinese 
multinational high-tech firm, globalized for 20 years in the overseas market, described their 
strategy, "when we do globalization, we have to balance with localization… and we believe the 
very fundamental part is to build one open, fair and transparent management system … we also 
decide our strategy based on our own business … we have our five-year plan".  Such a mindset 
and behaviour should be the role model for ordinary Chinese firms conducting business overseas.   
 
Conclusion 
With the significant positive historical evidence of China's silk road, back from thousands of years 
ago, the BRI would have to play an essential role in connecting each corner of the world by 
facilitating shared prosperity for the 21st century. Despite bias and different views toward the 
progress of cooperation between the member states, the BRI, with its vision for the goodness of 
global population, should not be displaced.  
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In addition to setting up high-level discussions and agreements in a top-down approach, I propose 
that entrepreneurs (at a corporate and enterprise level) from both sides should be given enough 
space to collaborate in a bottom-up approach. Both sides should arrange coordinating committees 
to facilitate the BRI progress (building up a database, executing management of the BRI agenda 
and work plan amongst the BRI related countries, proposing the BRI rules and regulations, finding 
solutions to existing crippling problems, eliminating an overall defensive and competitive 
mentality, and creating a cooperative foundation for the future agenda).  The BRI's progress should 
not rest only on the shoulder of a single country and a single government, but should be on the 
shoulders of all participants, from the businesses, research institutes, education centres, and 
individuals. By combining everyone’s joint efforts, the BRI's aim to set up an inclusively equality-
oriented prosperous community can be realized. But something we need to always bear in mind is 
that difference is the source of challenges, disputes, and problems, while simultaneously also 
ironically the driver of opportunities, collaborations, and solutions. To deal with a paradox of 
opportunity and threat, a paradox in the process of globalization and localization, each of us is 
required to continuously believe in humankind’s universal values and the principle of singularity. 
Behaviour-wise, each of us must pay collective intelligence and courage, and apply hard work as 
a strongly bonded team. 
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